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Abstract
Across Europe, banks remain, to this day, the main suppliers of finance to the European economy, but also a source of
systemic risk. As such, regulating them requires that policymakers find an appropriate balance between restricting their
risk-taking behaviour and increasing lending to support economic growth. However, the ‘varieties of financial capitalism’
that characterize national banking sectors in Europe mean that the adoption of harmonised capital requirements has differ-
ent effects across countries, depending on the country-specific institutional setting through which banks provide lending
to the national economy. This article conducts a new analysis of Member State governments’ positions in the post-financial
crisis reform of the EU capital requirements legislation, expanding the scope of previous studies on the topic. Here, I exam-
ine in detail the positions of Member States on a wider set of issues and for a broader set of countries than the existing
literature. Building on the varieties of financial capitalism approach, I explain these positions with regard to structural fea-
tures of national banking sectors. I find that Member State governments’ positions reveal a general agreement with the
proposed increase of bank capital requirements, while seeking targeted exemptions and preferential treatment that they
deem necessary to preserve their domestic supply of retail credit.
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1. Introduction
On 27 March 2020, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the international standard-setter for banks’
capital requirements, announced the deferral of imple-
mentation deadlines of the Basel III framework—
adopted in response to the global financial crisis of
2008—to ensure “that banks and supervisors are able
to commit their full resources to respond to the impact
of Covid-19” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2020). As for the EU transposition of the final elements of
the international standards, it seems that the European
Commission (EC) has put on ice the legislative proposal
amending the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and
Capital Requirements Regulation that it was supposed to
issue in June 2020.
This reaction to the emerging economic fallout
of Covid-19 suggests policymakers, first, consider that
banks should play an important role in fostering eco-
nomic recovery, and second, fear that the planned tight-
ening of capital requirements may be incompatible, in
the short term, with said bank support of the real
economy. How EU Member States face this perceived
short-term trade-off is of particular importance in the
context of Economic and Monetary Union. Economic
and Monetary Union reforms in recent years (see e.g.,
Rehm, 2021) relied on the assumption that banking
regulation—notably capital requirements—would, by
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reining-in banks’ excessive leverage, contribute to reduc-
ing the interdependence that tied together banks and
public finances in a vicious circle and wreaked havoc
on several Member States during the sovereign debt cri-
sis (Merler & Pisani-Ferry, 2012). Nevertheless, the EU’s
transposition of the early parts of Basel III (known as
CRD-IV) was criticised for watering down the interna-
tional framework (Véron, 2013). Previous international
political economy accounts of the negotiation have
attributed much of this dilution to some Member States’
demands for limiting the increase of capital require-
ments in order to protect the competitiveness of their
respective banking sectors, but also to preserve short-
term economic growth (see e.g., Howarth & Quaglia,
2013, 2016a).
This article pursues two objectives. The first is to pro-
vide a new examination of Member State positions on
the CRD-IV reform, analysing a larger sample of coun-
tries than previous studies and delving into the technical
detail of positions on a series of issues, some of which
have not been examined before. Analysing the responses
of fifteen Member States’ national authorities to three
EC preparatory consultations, I find that, instead of clear
general preferences for tighter rules on bank capital or
conversely, a general forbearance, each Member State’s
requests for preferential treatment focus on very specific
instruments and institutions amid a general agreement
with the necessity to increase bank capitalisation.
The second objective is to explain these particular
positions. Important literature on Basel III and CRD-IV
suggests that the lobbying of the banking industry—
in particular by large, international banks—significantly
shaped the debate on post-crisis capital requirements
(e.g., Lall, 2012; Young, 2014). However, while many of
the requested changes did benefit large banks, Member
State positions and the wish list of international banks
differ in important ways. International political econ-
omy, in turn, suggests that the ‘varieties of financial
capitalism’—that is, the country-specific institutional set-
tings that characterise banking sectors—that coexist in
Europe mediate Member State preferences on finan-
cial regulation (Story & Walter, 1997). Among relevant
factors, previous studies have notably highlighted the
role of bank capitalisation levels and bank-industry ties
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016a) and different degrees of for-
eign ownership (Spendzharova, 2012) in national bank-
ing sectors. Here I argue that, while these are relevant
factors, in order to account for the detailed amendments
the Member States requested, we must also consider the
qualitative composition of banking sectors and the types
of instruments on which retail lending relies.
The next two sections present the analytical frame-
work (2) and methodological approach (3) of the article.
I then examine Member State positions on CRD-IV, high-
lighting the conflictual issues and suggesting variables
that explain these conflicts (4). I then discuss these find-
ings in terms of ‘varieties of financial capitalism’ (5) and
conclude (6).
2. Analytical Framework
International political economy has long framed pol-
icymakers’ preferences on banking regulation as a
‘dilemma’ between two conflicting goals: financial sta-
bility through strict capital requirements and interna-
tional competitiveness through reducing the cost of reg-
ulation of national banks (Kapstein, 1989; Singer, 2004).
The economic downturn that followed the 2008 finan-
cial crisis added short-term economic growth to the list
of concerns: Policymakers perceived that “trade-offs—
perceived or real—might still have to be made and
notably between financial stability and economic growth
because, ceteris paribus, banks need to deleverage—and
thus shrink their lending—to improve their capital posi-
tion” (Howarth & Quaglia, 2016a, p. 206). There is how-
ever no consensus among economists about the relation
between capital requirements, credit supply, and eco-
nomic growth, and while in the short-to-medium term
higher capital requirements are expected to increase
the cost of credit for borrowers (Macroeconomic
Assessment Group, 2010), higher capitalisation levels are
likely to bring net long-term benefits in terms of GDP
growth (Admati & Hellwig, 2013).
Here I assume that policymakers were aware of these
debates as well as of the short-term costs and long-term
benefits associated with higher capital requirements,
but still perceived that a trade-off needed to be made
between the long-term objective of a resilient banking
sector and the short-term objective of maintaining a
steady flow of credit to fight off the post-financial cri-
sis recession. Whether, on a particular issue of banking
regulation, Member States favoured one or the other
depends, I argue, on the structural features of their
national economies and banking sectors and the extent
to which the proposal was likely to affect the supply of
credit to the national real economy, particularly SMEs
and households. This analysis then builds on the ‘vari-
eties of financial capitalism’ approach (Story & Walter,
1997) and seeks to complement previous accounts of the
CRD-IV negotiations.
In their respective works, Howarth and Quaglia
(2013, 2016a) and Spendzharova (2012) have put for-
ward three explanatory factors to account for Member
State positions. Howarth and Quaglia explain the conflict
between the Franco-German tandem and the UK on the
level of minimum capital ratios in terms of systemic pat-
terns of bank capital (different levels and composition)
and bank-industry ties (degrees of real economy reliance
on bank credit). Spendzharova, focusing on Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries, shows how the pre-
dominance of foreign ownership in those countries’
banking sectors made their governments fearful of for-
eign banks depleting local subsidiaries in order to repa-
triate funds to the home country in case of trouble.
Following a similar approach, I argue that, in order
to account for the specific exemptions and preferen-
tial treatments the Member States requested, we must
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also take into account the types of banks that domi-
nate each country’s banking sector and the particular
instruments on which they rely to supply credit to the
real economy. Indeed, banks of different sizes (small
local banks vs. large banking groups) and legal forms
(joint stock vs. cooperative, mutual, savings, and public
banks) which rely on different sets of financial instru-
ments would be affected in very different ways by the
Basel III rules. Where each country stands in relation to
these structural factors is then likely to shape in impor-
tant ways how their common double preference for sta-
bility and growth translates into positions on specific
policy proposals. This is not to say that Member State
positions are fully determined by economic and bank-
ing sector structures—the different levels of politiciza-
tion (Högenauer, 2021), as well as different sets of value-
based ideas (van Loon, 2021) of financial regulation
issues across Member States, also contribute to shaping
positions—but that these largely determine the material
interests at stake in capital requirements. The analysis
presented in this article should thus be seen as a comple-
mentary contribution to the fruitful research agenda on
national preference formation about international finan-
cial regulation. The next section will detail which coun-
tries constitute the sample, as well as the CRD-related
issues chosen for analysis. Section 4 will then outline, for
each of the six selected issues, the positions adopted by
Member States.
3. Methodological Approach
The focus of this article on Member State governments
is justified, I believe, first by the central role that gov-
ernments play in the policymaking process for capital
requirements at the international and European level,
and second by the fact that they remain, ultimately,
responsible for macroeconomic stabilisation. I choose to
extract Member State governments’ positions on reform
proposals from the written comments they submitted
in response to three public consultations conducted by
the EC in 2008, 2009, and 2010. These documents have
the advantage (when compared to collecting positions
through interviews or a review of press coverage) that
they emanate directly from the national representatives
involved in the negotiation, offering a detailed view of
positions which have not been subject to any posthoc
reinterpretation. Furthermore, because they all respond
to the same set of EC questions, they facilitate the cross-
country comparison of positions on a given set of issues.
The period 2008–2010 corresponds to the prepara-
tory works for the EC’s 2011 CRD-IV proposal, which
the EC conducted in parallel to the elaboration of the
Basel III standards. In this article, I limit the analysis to
six broad issues: definition of capital, large exposures, liq-
uidity standards, leverage ratio, treatment of mortgage
loans, and supervisory arrangements. These constitute
only a subset of all the issues consulted during the period
but were selected for the potential of conflict among
Member States on the degree of stringency vs. leniency
and the degree of harmonisation vs. national discretion
that the new framework should permit.
15 EU Member States are analysed (see Table 1).
The selection includes all the Member States whose gov-
ernment (Treasury department) submitted an answer to
at least one of the three consultations. 14 out of the
27 EU Member States provided comments at the time,
but of these, I excluded Slovenia and added Italy and
Spain. The 2008 Slovenian response did not address any
of the substantial issues raised by the consultation—
only one minor technicality—and could not be used
Table 1. Commenting national authorities.
2008 2009 2010
Country/Year (large exposures; (definition of capital; mortgages; (definition of capital; liquidity;
(issues) supervisory arrangements) supervisory arrangements) mortgages; supervisory arrangements)
Austria Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Czechia Treasury CB Treasury
Denmark Supervisor — Treasury/Supervisor
Estonia — CB Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Finland Treasury Treasury Treasury
France Treasury/FSA* Treasury Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Germany Treasury Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury
Hungary Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB
Ireland — — Treasury
Italy — — CB
Poland Treasury/FSA* — Treasury
Slovakia CB — Treasury/CB*
Spain CB CB CB
Sweden Treasury/CB/Supervisor* — Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
UK — Treasury/CB/Supervisor* Treasury/CB/Supervisor*
Notes: CB = Central Bank; * = Joint submission; — = No submission. The documents are available with the article’s Supplementary File.
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to extract positions. Although there were no Italian or
Spanish government responses available, I include these
two countries using responses by their respective central
banks as a proxy, supplemented by a review of finance
ministers’ public statements. With these additions, the
selected countries constitute a representative sample
of EU Member States, including in particular both large
and small banking sectors with a variety of banking sec-
tor structures.
We should note that the absence of published com-
ments from a government does not imply that it takes no
position: A government may have required that its com-
ments not be published or may have used another way,
other than the consultation, to convey its views on the
proposals (e.g., Council meetings). For reasons of com-
parability across different methods for collecting posi-
tions, I chose to limit the analysis to countries for which
responses were available, Italy and Spain constituting the
only exceptions which were partly compensated for by
their central banks’ responses.
To analyse positions, I first extracted from each doc-
ument the sections devoted to each of the six issues
and summarised them. The Supplementary File provides
the reader with this summary of each country’s position
for each of the six issues. In a second step, I applied
a “constant comparative method” (Glaser & Strauss,
1967, pp. 101–116) to identify similarities and differ-
ences across responses, thereby identifying recurrent
themes and oppositions. The result of this process is pre-
sented in Section 4.
4. Member State Positions
4.1. Definition of Capital
At its core, the Basel framework defines how much of a
bank’s assets (its various investments and the loans it dis-
tributes) must be funded through financial instruments
that contractually are able to absorb potential losses aris-
ing from borrowers defaulting or bad investments both
during the life of the bank (‘going-concern’) and in case
of failure (‘gone-concern’). These loss-absorbing instru-
ments constitute banks’ ‘capital.’ Regulatory capital is
broader than the equity held by its shareholders, and
also include a series of debt securities. Defining bank
capital then implies listing the instruments that are suf-
ficiently loss-absorbent to be part of the capital base,
which in Basel III, is divided into three buckets: common
equity tier 1 (CET1), the most loss-absorbent and broadly
corresponding to common shares or equivalents; addi-
tional tier 1, which includes debt instruments that can
be written-down to absorb exceptional losses on a going-
concern basis; and tier 2, which includes debt securities
to be written down only in case of failure. Furthermore,
‘prudential adjustments’ have to be made to amounts of
eligible instruments to account for particular situations
that may make part of the capital base unavailable to
absorb losses.
On eligibility criteria, the most recurrent theme
regarded the limitation of CET1 to common shares.
Pre-crisis, Member States could adjust the CRD rules
to local specificities in the national transposition, thus
definitions of core capital varied importantly across
countries. The harmonisation on a common shares
model would significantly affect banking sectors where
non-joint stock banks (the various forms of banks whose
core capital is not composed of traditional public listed
shares, notably cooperatives, mutuals, savings banks
and a number of public banks) are important actors,
since these banks would have to either change their
legal structures to meet the new requirements or disap-
pear. The countries calling most forcefully in defence
of non-joint stock banks’ capital instruments were,
unsurprisingly, those where non-joint stock banks rep-
resent a large part of the banking sector: Austria and
Germany above all, followed by Finland and France.
In 2016, more than half of the Other Systemically
Important Institutions (O-SIIs)—that is, domestic system-
ically important banks—in those countries were either
public banks (e.g., several German Landesbanken), or
the central institutions of cooperative and savings banks
(e.g., Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International, France’s
Groupe Crédit Mutuel, or Germany’s DZ Bank, see
Table 2), which shows their importance not only in
terms of their size but also in terms of their centrality
in the domestic economy. Illustrating the cost of har-
monisation, Germany also made a plea for temporarily
maintaining the possibility to include in tier 2 coopera-
tive bank members’ uncalled commitments which until
then had been allowed under German law but excluded
under Basel III and which constitute an important part
of German cooperative banks’ capital. By contrast, those
countries that have no non-joint stock bank among their
Table 2. Systemic importance of non-joint stock banks
(2016).
Number of non-joint stock banks to total
















Source: European Banking Authority (2016).
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O-SIIs did not insist on the issue and merely mentioned
the need to make the criteria compatible with differ-
ent legal structures. The 2010 reform of the important
Spanish Cajas sector, which transformed them into joint-
stock banks largely explains why Spain did not voice con-
cerns on this issue.
On prudential adjustments, the full deduction of
‘minority interests’ (capital instruments held by minor-
ity shareholders of a banking group subsidiary) was
opposed by a diverse set of countries: Austria, Czechia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and
Spain. The deduction would affect banking groups by
reducing the contribution of subsidiaries to groups’
‘consolidated’ (i.e., aggregate) amounts of capital. For
Austria, France, Italy and Spain—home to several interna-
tionalised banking groups—important amounts of minor-
ity interests (see Table 3) reflect a strategy to raise
capital for the group through subsidiaries. Considering
the generally low levels of bank capitalisation in those
countries, minority interests were then to constitute an
important resource to meet the increased capital require-
ments. Similarly, France—the land of the bancassurance
model of financial conglomerates—forcefully opposed
the deduction of investments in insurance subsidiaries
which would also have impacted the capital ratios of
all its major banking groups (International Monetary
Fund, 2011). By contrast, the UK’s large banks, being
better capitalised than their continental peers (HSBC,
Lloyds and Barclays all had above 10% of CET1 capital at
end-2010, to be compared to 8.1% for France’s Société
Générale, 7.8% for Italy’s UniCredit and 7.1% for Spain’s
Santander; European Banking Authority, 2011), did not
need to rely on minority interests. Czechia, Hungary, and
Slovakia, in turn, are in this debate hosting the sub-
sidiaries raising minority interests (see Table 5) and high-
lighted in their comments the risk that the deduction
would create an incentive for groups to undercapitalise
local subsidiaries.
4.2. Large Exposures
So called ‘large exposures’ are a bank’s exposures to a
single client or group of connected clients that could put
the bank’s solvency at risk in case of that client failing to
repay. Limits on large exposures existed in the pre-crisis
CRD to penalise such exposures but included a number
of options for Member States to grant exemptions, in
particular to intra-group (between entities of the same
banking group) and certain interbank (between two inde-
pendent banks) transactions. In 2008, the EC suggested
strengthening the regime and consulted on withdrawing
options and exemptions. Limits on intra-group transac-
tions are especially relevant for banking groups, as they
limit their freedom to shift capital and liquidities from
one group entity to another. Limits on interbank trans-
actions are crucial for decentralised banking networks
(those where members of the network are independent
of each other but share a brand and some central insti-
tutions, for example, the German Sparkassen) inasmuch
as they impact liquidity management within the network
as well as more generally for banks’ daily liquidity man-
agement, since banks may need to borrow or lend large
amounts on the interbank market.
Among the responding countries to the 2008 con-
sultation, we find two overlapping groups supporting a
more lenient regime. One was composed of the countries
whose banking sector includes important decentralised
banking networks and was eager to maintain exemptions
for claims on central institutions of decentralised banking
networks and on transactions where both parties are part
of a joint risk-management or institutional protection
scheme, which usually is the case of decentralised bank-
ing networks. The second group includes countries that
are home to large banking groups and called for main-
taining the options to exempt intragroup transactions
between entities submitted to the same consolidated
supervision. Austria is part of the first group; Denmark,
Table 3. Capital ratios and minority interests (2010).
Country Solvency ratio (%) Tier 1 ratio (%) Minority interests to total equity (%)
Austria 13.20 9.98 15.07
Czechia 15.25 13.61 2.07
Denmark 16.24 14.07 3.45
Estonia 16.29 12.69 0.02
Finland 14.56 13.73 0.23
France 12.56 10.76 8.74
Germany 15.28 11.41 2.30
Hungary 14.09 11.55 NA
Ireland 14.50 11.56 1.33
Italy 12.06 8.66 4.46
Poland 14.01 12.59 0.64
Slovakia 12.53 11.38 NA
Spain 11.89 9.65 6.58
Sweden 12.24 10.65 0.19
UK 15.86 10.86 5.47
Source: European Central Bank (2021).
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France, Spain, and Sweden of the second; Germany
and Finland are part of both. Furthermore, countries
with highly concentrated banking sectors, France and
Sweden, expressed concerns about liquidity manage-
ment and a possible destabilisation of the interbank mar-
ket unless further exemptions were made. Finally, Poland
and Czechia joined Austria, Sweden, and Germany in wel-
coming the exemption for smaller transactions.
Conversely, Czechia and Slovakia, two countries with
foreign-dominated banking sectors (see Table 5), called
for maintaining the national discretion to impose more
restrictive limits on large intragroup transactions. This
discretion was necessary, they argued, to prevent local
subsidiaries from being exposed to the failure of group
entities in other Member States. Sweden, conversely,
strongly opposed such discretion, warning that national
authorities could use it for ring-fencing at the expense
of efficiency.
4.3. Liquidity Requirements
Liquidity standards were discussed in the 2010 consulta-
tion. Few countries had liquidity requirements in place
before the crisis and there were none in international
or European standards before Basel III and its transpo-
sition. Liquidity standards apply essentially on the assets
side of banks’ balance sheets: They require banks to hold
reserves of ‘liquid’ assets, that is, assets that can be sold
for cash immediately, even in times of crisis, without
incurring any significant loss. While the liquidity cover-
age ratio aims to ensure that banks maintain a liquid-
ity buffer sufficient to withstand a one-month-long mar-
ket stress, the net stable funding ratio requires banks to
match their long-term lending commitments with corre-
sponding long-term funding sources.
In relation to the liquidity coverage ratio, the main
issue was listing the assets liquid enough to be included
in the buffer, the so-called ‘high-quality liquid assets’
(HQLAs). Initial proposals essentially restricted eligibility
to government bonds and stable deposits, a position sup-
ported by the UK and Estonia, but opposed by most other
responding Member States (Austria, Czechia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and
Sweden), who called for the larger inclusion of additional
assets. This conflict can easily be understood by look-
ing at levels of liquid asset holdings across countries
(Table 4). The British and Estonian banking sectors were
still in 2014 (earliest data published by the European
Central Bank) the ones with the highest share of liquid
assets in total banking sector assets (above 30%), and
Estonia—unlike the other countries—already had tight
liquidity requirements in place before the CRD-IV reform.
Conversely, almost all the proponents of a more inclusive
HQLA buffer (Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, and Sweden) had ratios of liq-
uid assets to total assets below 20%, and some far below
(Austria). For those countries, a liquidity coverage ratio
with a narrow HQLA definition would force banks to mas-
sively shift assets away from less liquid but productive
assets, typically those funding the real economy.
For the pro-inclusion countries, HQLAs should
notably include more covered bonds. Covered bonds
are a particular form of securitisation where the pool of
securitised assets is, in most cases, restricted to mort-
gage loans. These market-based assets developed at an
exceptional rate across Europe since the early 2000s
to supplement insufficient deposits in meeting mort-
gage lenders’ funding needs (Johnson, Isgrò, & Bouyon,
2016, p. 7). Denmark and Sweden were the most vocal
on this issue, stressing the stability of covered bonds
Table 4. Covered bonds and liquid assets.
Outstanding covered bonds (% of total Liquid assets (% of total banking
banking sector liabilities) sector assets)
Country/Year 2008 2012 2018 2014
Denmark 28.7 41.8 50.3 10.5
Sweden 10.5 14.1 18.8 12.4
Spain 9.7 12 7 13.4
Germany 8.3 7.2 5.6 13.11
Slovakia 6.2 7.8 6.6 23.9
Czechia 5.9 5.6 5.5 NA
Hungary 5.7 5.1 3.4 16.37
Ireland 4.8 5.6 6.0 26.39
France 3.8 5.6 4.8 15.46
UK 2.5 1.9 1.1 31.11
Austria 2 4 6.6 5.6
Finland 1.6 4.6 5 16.6
Italy 0.6 4.8 6.9 11.8
Poland 0.3 0.3 1.3 18.5
Estonia 0 0 0 39.22
Sources: European Central Bank (2021); European Covered Bonds Council (2020); author’s calculation.
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through the financial crisis, their importance for (mort-
gage) banks’ funding and the likely destabilising effect
on covered bond and mortgage markets should they
be excluded. In Denmark, the entire mortgage credit
system—the defence of which in CRD-IV was “absolutely
central” for finance minister Brian Mikkelsen (“Minister
diskuterer,” 2010)—relies on covered bonds. The fact
that the EC specifically asked about covered bonds in
its consultation is already evidence of their importance
in European banking. As can be seen from Table 4, cov-
ered bonds constitute an important source of funding for
banks, upon which they increasingly relied through the
crisis years. Germany’s stance on the issue should, for
instance, be seen in light of the fact that their reliance
on the stable Pfandbriefe market enabled German sav-
ings and cooperative banks to maintain lending levels
through the crisis (Hardie & Howarth, 2013a). The Basel-
proposed cap on covered bonds in HQLAs would have
depressed market demand for these assets, drying up
an important source of refinancing for mortgage loans.
By contrast, Spain’s large covered bond market, which
made possible the Cajas’ frenzy of real-estate lending
(Royo, 2013), was bound to adjust, which may explain
the Banco de España’s silence regarding their inclusion
in HQLAs.
Countries with important non-joint stock banking
sectors also called for different types of preferential
treatment for them. Germany called for the inclu-
sion of “debt securities fully guaranteed by sovereigns
or…securities of promotional banks under public own-
ership” (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2010, p. 2;
see Supplementary File), that is, securities issued by its
Landesbanken. Austria, Poland, and Slovakia, which all
have cooperative or savings banks’ central institutions
among their systemically important institutions, asked
for cooperative banks’ deposits in their central institu-
tions to be recognised as ‘stable,’ therefore contributing
more to these institutions’ stock of HQLAs.
On the net stable funding ratio, only Estonia
defended a more conservative treatment than that pro-
posed by the EC. All the other respondents to the
2010 consultation warned of its potentially destabilising
effect on lending. Indeed, since it requires banks to bal-
ance the maturity of their liabilities and assets, it effec-
tively forces banks to either reduce their reliance on
short-term wholesale funding or limit their lending to
and investments in long-term assets, notably loans to
corporates and households, that is, the real economy.
The UK authorities (HM Treasury & Bank of England,
2010, p. 7; see Supplementary File) thus warned that
the ratio “could significantly disadvantage SME and retail
loans relative to lending to large highly-rated corporates.”
It then sided with Austria, Germany, and Slovakia in call-
ing for more favourable treatment of retail lending in
terms of the stable funding required. Regarding the pro-
vision of stable funding, countries with important net-
works of independent cooperatives (Austria, Germany,
but also Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) called for pref-
erential treatment of these banks’ deposits with their
central institutions. Calls for preferential treatment of
covered bonds were also made, in particular by Austria,
Denmark, France, and Germany.
The choice of the level of application (entity-level
or consolidated level) and the proposal to shift the
supervision of cross-border branch liquidity to the home-
country supervisor were two issues marked by oppo-
sition between CEE Member States plus the UK, and
the other governments. While the latter supported shift-
ing decision-making power to the home-country super-
visor (supervising the group) on liquidity issues, the for-
mer insisted on preserving the freedom of the host-
country supervisor (supervising a subsidiary) to impose
the respect of liquidity coverage ratio and net stable
funding ratio at the level of branches and subsidiaries.
Observing the varying degree of foreign ownership in
national banking sectors (Table 5) helps make sense of
Table 5. Foreign ownership of national banking sectors.
Foreign-owned assets in total banking Foreign O-SIIs to total number of















Source: Claessens and van Horen (2012, p. 34); European Banking Authority (2016).
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this divide: CEE banking sectors are characterised by a
dominance of foreign banks, which own between a third
and nearly all of total banking sector assets, and for-
eign banks constitute a major source of systemic risk in
those countries, where they represent the majority of
O-SIIs. The British banking sector is in a similar situa-
tion of exposure to foreign banks’ systemic risk, with 12
out its sixteen O-SIIs being foreign-owned. By contrast,
those countries supportive of home-country supervision
are predominantly—Ireland being the exception—home
to internationalised banking groups and little exposed to
foreign banks.
4.4. Leverage Ratio
A leverage ratio requirement was a novelty introduced
with Basel III: It is intended to act as a complement
to risk-based capital requirements by setting a maxi-
mum nominal amount (not risk-weighted) of assets that
a bank can acquire with its capital base. The most
controversial issue was whether the new requirement
should be a binding minimum (Pillar 1) or an indicator
upon which supervisors could impose additional capi-
tal requirements if necessary (Pillar 2). A binding lever-
age ratio was expected to particularly affect undercapi-
talised banks, but the risk-insensitiveness of the measure
was also expected to put relatively safer banking activi-
ties, notably traditional deposit-taking and retail lending,
at a disadvantage: under the leverage ratio, they would
‘cost’ as much capital as riskier activities through yielding
less income. The Swedish authorities (Regeringkansliet,
Finansinspektionen, & Sveriges Riksbank, 2010, p. 4; see
Supplementary File), for instance, thus considered it
“important that a leverage ratio is not designed and cali-
brated so that it endangers the supply of mortgage credit
to Swedish households.”
Table 6. Leverage (2011).

















Of the respondents to the 2010 consultation, only
the UK unambiguously argued in favour of a binding ratio.
At the other extreme, France and Germany forcefully
rejected the proposal, denouncing its likely unintended
effects on bank lending. All the other respondents
(Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland,
Sweden) argued for an introduction in Pillar 2. Beyond
average leverage levels across countries (Table 6), under-
standing the opposition requires one to consider the
parallel effect of proposals on the definition of capital,
notably the deduction of minority interests and invest-
ments in insurance subsidiaries (see above) that would
reduce the capital base of continental European banks
more than that of their British competitors.
4.5. Treatment of Mortgage Loans
The 2009 and 2010 consultations contained proposals
to reform the prudential treatment of mortgage loans
(loans that are guaranteed by commercial or residential
real estate) and in particular the conditions for grant-
ing them a preferential treatment under the form of a
reduced 35% risk weight to part of the loan (i.e., only
35% of the amount would count towards the bank’s risk-
weighted assets). The pre-crisis framework gave Member
States an important degree of discretion to decide which
loans could benefit from the preferential treatment.
The EC proposed setting a harmonised condition under
the form of a maximum loan-to-value ratio: The preferen-
tial risk-weight could be applied to the lent amount only
up to a certain threshold relative to the value of the mort-
gaged real-estate property (40% in the 2009 proposal,
80% in 2010); the remaining amount would be applied
a much higher risk weight (1,250%) in order to discour-
age lending to highly leveraged clients.
Respondents to the 2009 consultation unanimously
rejected the proposed 40% loan-to-value ratio, denounc-
ing its likely impact on mortgage credit supply. Indeed,
the proposal would have led to most mortgage loans
being more costly for banks (more regulatory capital),
who would pass the extra cost to clients. In 2017, across
the sample of countries, mortgage loans represented
on average 42.82% of all bank loans and advances
(European Central Bank’s Statistical Data Warehouse),
ranging from 18.35% (France) to 61.62% (Estonia).
The emergence of mortgage lending in Europe since
the 1990s owes a lot to favourable legislation (Johnson
et al., 2016) and has become an essential instrument for
home ownership. In 2017, more than a third of home-
owners had a mortgage in Denmark, France, Finland,
Sweden, and the UK, with CEE markets are quickly catch-
ing up (European Mortgage Federation, 2019, p. 40).
The cost increase would then affect the masses, which
may explain why even in a country like Spain—where
a real-estate bubble brought about a banking crisis—
was reluctant to increase requirements on all mortgages
(Banco de España, 2009, 2010; see Supplementary File).
In 2009, the EC also suggested tightening specifically
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the treatment of mortgage loans denominated in a for-
eign currency. The issue was taken up only by the three
responding CEE countries: Czechia, Estonia, and Hungary,
who criticised the harshness of the proposals, whereas
Austria welcomed them. Estonia and Hungary notably
called to differentiate loans denominated in euros from
loans in other currencies, the exchange rate risk being
lower with the former.
The 2010 proposal for an 80% loan-to-value, more in
line with industry practices, was more welcome. However,
all respondents rejected the proposal to align the
treatment of residential real-estate mortgages on that,
more demanding, of commercial real-estate mortgages.
The heterogeneity of European real-estate markets
sparked calls from Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden,
and the UK to maintain a certain degree of national dis-
cretion. The German government (Bundesministerium
der Finanzen, 2010, p. 24; see Supplementary File) thus
invoked the “particular importance of RRE [residential
real-estate] financing” in its call to retain existing options.
Only France, whose banks rely comparatively less on
mortgages and which have large foreign retail activities,
explicitly welcomed full harmonisation.
4.6. Supervisory Arrangements
Proposals regarding the degree of freedom granted
to national authorities—legislator and supervisor—to
adapt EU standards to banks active in their jurisdiction
saw a clear opposition appear between ‘home’ and ‘host’
countries. The EC notably consulted in 2008 on ‘colleges
of supervisors’ for cross-border banking groups. Czechia,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (the four ‘host’ countries;
see Table 5) responded: First, by forcefully defending
guaranteed rights for host-country supervisors to partici-
pate in colleges, against the proposal to leave the home-
country supervisor to decide on the composition and,
second, they called for the limiting of colleges’ decision-
making powers, not to impinge on host-country supervi-
sors’ competences. Among these ‘home’ countries the
positions varied: Austria and Finland agreed on the issue
of composition, while France called for granting a strong
decision-making role to colleges and an important role
for the consolidating supervisor within them. In 2008,
the criteria for designating branches of foreign banks
as ‘systemically important’ were also discussed. The EC
proposed additional rights for host-country supervisors,
which Slovakia and Poland explicitly welcomed, although
Poland called for a lower threshold (branch deposits to
total banking sector deposits) for considering a branch
as systemically relevant. Conversely, Germany opposed
shifting additional branch supervision powers to host-
country supervisors, and Finland and Sweden opposed
any threshold lower than 5% of a national banking sec-
tors’ total deposits.
The 2009 and 2010 consultations furthermore sug-
gested the removal of most of the existing options
and national discretions in the CRD and the maxi-
mum harmonisation of Pillar 1 requirements across
the EU. This move to maximum harmonisation would
deprive national authorities of the possibility to adapt
European standards to local circumstances. France was
the most vocal supporter of maximum harmonisation,
which Denmark, Finland, and Germany also welcomed.
Austria and Ireland equally supported the removal of
options and national discretions, with the exception of
real-estate. Conversely, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the UK
(which I consider as a ‘host’ country due to the impor-
tance of foreign O-SIIs in its banking sector), but also
Spain and Sweden rejected maximum harmonisation for
the sake of financial stability, doing so both individually
(in their responses to public consultations) and collec-
tively in a letter to Commissioners Michel Barnier and Olli
Rehn (Djankov et al., 2011).
As with liquidity requirements and large exposures,
CEE countries’ and the UK’s opposition to transfers
of supervisory competence and reduction of national
discretion appear motivated by the need to ensure
against the systemic risk posed by the important oper-
ations of foreign banks within their jurisdictions. The link
that CEE responses establish between national discre-
tion and national responsibility for financial stability
(e.g., Ministry of Finance of Estonia, Bank of Estonia,
& Estonian Financial Supervisory Authority, 2010, p. 13;
Hungarian authorities, 2008, p. 1; Polish Ministry of
Finance & Polish Financial Supervision Authority, 2008,
p. 2; see Supplementary File) illustrate Spendzharova’s
(2012, p. 319) observation that these governments
“were not apprehensive about transferring power to the
supranational level per se. They did worry, however,
about the fiscal and accountability consequences.” Czech
finance minister Miroslav Kalousek thus stated in May
2012: “There was a danger that the bank’s regulator
abroad would have more power over banks than the
Czech supervisor….This could mean that parent banks
could vacuum the Czech branches” (“EU: Na banky,”
2012). Spain and Sweden, conversely, are among the
countries least exposed to foreign banks, and their par-
ticular opposition to maximum harmonisation (but not
to home supervision) finds its roots in their respective
choice to increase capital requirements nationally to
fight off domestic banking crises (in Sweden in the 1990s
and in Spain with the Cajas from 2009).
5. Discussion of Results
We can already see governments’ will to find a com-
promise between reducing bank leverage and preserv-
ing retail lending in the French and British attempts to
impose retail-lending targets in exchange for bailouts
(Jabko & Massoc, 2012; Macartney, 2014). A review of
finance ministers’ public statements around the time
of the CRD-IV negotiation further reveals their fear
that Basel III “risk[ed] threatening the financing of the
economy” (“Christine Lagarde,” 2010). Already in July
2009, Germany’s Peer Steinbrück advocated a relax-
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ation of Basel II rules so that banks could increase lend-
ing to avoid a credit crunch (“Regierung und,” 2009)
and Austria’s Josef Pröll reformed national taxes on
banks to make retail lending a comparatively more
attractive business (“Neuer Zwist,” 2010). For Italy’s
Giulio Tremonti “Basel 3 [was] the direct way to pro-
duce a credit crunch” (“Banche: Tremonti,” 2010) and
Germany’s Wolfgang Schaüble summed up the general
mood stating: “We want a tightening of the rules [but]
the financial sector must be in a position to continue
to carry out its business” (“Highlights-Comments,” 2010).
As we could see in the previous section, this general will
to find a compromise between strengthening financial
stability and preserving lending however led Member
States to adopt contrasted positions, which reflect the
‘varieties of financial capitalism’ (Howarth & Quaglia,
2013; Story & Walter, 1997) that persist in Europe.
Across the issues examined above, we could thus
see the importance of the qualitative composition of
national banking sectors—in terms of the legal form
of banks that dominate them and whether they adopt
the form of large, consolidated groups or decentralised
networks—in shaping Member States’ wish list. Indeed,
the presence of (systemically) important cooperative,
savings or public banks in countries such as Austria,
Germany, France, but also Hungary or Poland is reflected
in their insistence on exemptions and exceptions tai-
lored to those particular types of bank, which have
been shown to constitute important sources of finance
for the local economies where they are established
(Ayadi, Llewellyn, Schmidt, Arbak, & De Groen, 2010;
Groeneveld, 2014). In June 2010, Austria’s finance min-
ister Josef Pröll explicitly linked his call for favourable
treatment of cooperative banks to avoid a credit crunch
(“Bankenabgabe kommt,” 2010). Similarly, countries
whose banking sectors are concentrated on a few large,
internationalised national champions responsible for a
major share of retail lending (e.g., France and Sweden)
were keen to support these champions.
The particular instruments banks use to provide
credit to corporates and households also appeared as
key factors. The unanimous rejection of a sharp tight-
ening of the treatment of mortgage loans reflected the
importance of that particular form of credit in all sam-
pled Member States, with those Member States where
a majority of loans are mortgages (Estonia, Denmark,
Sweden) making the most critical comments. Similarly,
the strongest defence for covered bonds came from
the countries where covered bonds markets are the
most developed and stable (e.g., Denmark, Sweden,
Germany). The particular defence of covered bonds may
be interpreted in view of the fact that these instruments
are specifically designed to support mortgage lending—
hence help maintain lending levels—and were resilient
through the financial crisis, so their inclusion would not
jeopardize the pursuit of financial stability.
Finally, on issues related to the distribution of com-
petences between home—and host-country supervisors
and to harmonisation vs. national discretion, we can see
a divide among Member States that reflects the varying
importance of foreign bank operations across national
banking sectors. The general reluctance of host coun-
tries (countries where foreign banks dominate the bank-
ing sector in terms of total assets or systemic impor-
tance; see Table 5) to give up national discretion reflect
their exposure to the risk that foreign parents repa-
triate resources to the home country in times of cri-
sis to benefit from nationally-oriented bailout schemes
(Roubini & Setser, 2004), closing local subsidiaries or forc-
ing them to deleverage rapidly, both resulting in a sharp
decline of local credit supply. Host countries’ insistence
on national discretion can then also be interpreted as
reflecting the general will to balance banks’ contribution
to the growth of the national economy with the systemic
risk they represent.
6. Conclusions
In this article, I sought to examine the detailed positions
of EU Member States on the post-crisis reform of capi-
tal requirements and to suggest factors that may explain
these positions. In so doing, I have shown the importance
of a series of structural features of national banking sec-
tors (diversity of banking sector compositions, types of
instruments used for retail lending, and varying degrees
of foreign ownership) for Member States’ assessment
of policy proposals. I find that in most of the exam-
ined cases these factors explain the particular positions
expressed by Member States. As such, my findings con-
firm the relevance of ‘varieties of financial capitalism’
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2013, 2016a; Story & Walter, 1997)
for our understanding of conflict between EU Member
States on issues of financial regulation: the particular
institutional setting on which each national banking sec-
tor relies to supply credit to the real economy mediates
governments’ double preference for stability and growth,
resulting in sometimes conflicting positions.
Covering only a subset of EU Member States and CRD-
related issues, this analysis is necessarily limited and
the explanation it provides for positions should be seen
as complementary to other international political econ-
omy accounts. Further research is likely to uncover addi-
tional dimensions of Europe’s ‘varieties of financial capi-
talism’ that shape Member State positions in important
ways. Furthermore, since 2010, important events have
occurred with major consequences for the setting of
capital requirements. Banking Union, first, redistributed
banking supervision and financial stability responsibil-
ities, affecting perceived trade-offs between stability
and growth (Epstein, 2017; Howarth & Quaglia, 2016b).
Second, if after Brexit the UK adopts a deregulatory
agenda on finance, the goal of promoting the competi-
tiveness of their national champions may regain impor-
tance for the remaining Member States home to interna-
tionalised banks.
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